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EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY TORTURE
The recent House of Lords decision in A and Others v
Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2) (December
8, 2005) has been hailed as a ringing endorsement of the
international legal principle prohibiting torture and the
evidentiary use of the fruits of torture as set forth under
Article 15 of the Torture Convention and recognised into
European law by Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The Lords decision allows persons certified
and detained as terrorists under the Anti-Crime, Security
and Terrorism Act 2001 to exclude the evidentiary use of
statements obtained by official torture in foreign countries.
The decision overruled a Court of Appeal decision, [2005]
1 WLR 414, that had upheld the powers of UK
administrative tribunals and the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission to receive evidence obtained by
official torture in foreign countries without involvement of
British authorities when reviewing the use of control
orders under UK anti-terrorist legislation.
The ruling reaffirms an important principle of English
common law that prohibits the admissibility of evidence
obtained under torture and gives effect to the UK’s
international legal obligation under the Convention against
Torture 1984 to exclude the use of any statements obtained
by official torture. The case, however, raises important
issues regarding the delicate balance to be struck between
protecting fundamental human rights and adopting special
legislation and measures to combat international
terrorism. Moreover, the decision raises a substantial
challenge to anti-terrorist efforts regarding the type of
evidentiary procedure to be used by special tribunals in
determining whether statements have been obtained by
torture and thus admissible against alleged terrorists.
In the decision, Lord Bingham identified the main issue
as being whether the special appeals tribunal established
under section 25 of the 2001 anti-terrorist Act to hear
appeals by persons certified and detained pursuant to
sections 21–23 of the act was empowered to hear evidence
which was or might have been obtained by official torture
in a foreign country. Lord Bingham stated that the
“principles of the common law, standing alone, compelled
the exclusion of third party torture evidence as unreliable,
unfair, offensive to ordinary standards of humanity and
decency and incompatible with the principles which should
animate a tribunal seeking to administer justice.”
Regarding Britain’s international legal obligations, he
observed that ‘[i]t was common ground that the
international prohibition of the use of torture enjoyed the
enhanced status of a jus cogens or peremptory norm of
general international law” which was “a norm from which
no derogation was permitted and which could be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law’.
This norm had been codified by the 1984 United Nations
Convention against Torture to which the United Kingdom
was a party. Moreover, he noted that UK law was subject to
the European Human Rights Convention “which itself
took account of the all but universal consensus embodied
in the Torture Convention.” Therefore, based on the
English common law and peremptory norms of
international law, he held that the special administrative
tribunals established under anti-terrorist legislation to hear
appeals of terrorist control orders were not allowed to hear
evidence that was or might have been procured by official
torture in a foreign country.
The Home Secretary had accepted that existing UK law
prohibited him from relying on evidence obtained by
torture if it was inflicted by or with the consent of British
authorities, but that the special powers created by section
25 of the 2001 Act empowered the special immigration
tribunals to hear any evidence submitted by the Home
Secretary, even if such evidence was procured, without
official British assistance, by torture in a foreign country.
According to the Home Secretary, the fact that evidence
had or might have been obtained by torture inflicted by
foreign officials without British assistance was relevant to
its weight but did not render it inadmissible. Moreover, the
Home Secretary suggested that, as a policy matter, he
would not ordinarily “rely on, or present to the
commission or the administrative court in relation to
control orders, evidence which he knew or believed to have
been obtained by a third country by torture.” However, he
argued that the admission of such evidence to the tribunals
was not precluded by law, although its submission would
generally be disfavoured as a matter of policy. The Home
Secretary’s undertaking in this regard was not a satisfactory
safeguard for Lord Bingham who declared that “the central
question was to be found not in government policy, which
might change, but in law.”
The Lords decision reaffirms the prohibition against
torture as a fundamental norm of international law.
Moreover, it clarifies the meaning of article 15 of the
Torture Convention as prohibiting the admission into
evidence, for any civil or criminal state proceeding or
enforcement action, statements obtained by official torture
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in a foreign country. Even under anti-terrorist legislation,
states are not free to derogate from this prohibition in
cases involving civil proceedings of deportation of terrorist
suspects or for indefinite detention of suspected terrorists.
The prohibition against the admissibility into evidence of
all statements induced by official torture in both civil and
criminal proceedings is now clearly recognised under UK
law, and could potentially lead to other jurisdictions,
especially those subject to the European Convention on
Human Rights, adopting similar interpretations.
However, it should be noted that some jurisdictions that
are parties to the Torture Convention, such as the United
States, have taken a different approach to deciding whether
to admit evidence that was procured by foreign torture. US
courts adhere to Federal Rules of Evidence 403 which
states that “relevant evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury.” Moreover, the US Supreme Court has held that
when US officials engage in conduct that “shocks the
conscience”, a US court must divest itself of jurisdiction
over the case and dismiss the indictment. United States v
Toscanino 500 F.2d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 1974).
This has been interpreted as applying to episodes when
US officials use torture to obtain statements from the
accused or from witnesses to be used against the accused.
United States v Yousef 327 F. 3d 56, 140 (2d. Cir. 2003).
However, if US officials are not involved in the torture that
procures the statements, then the evidence is potentially
admissible if it satisfies the criteria of Rule 403 of the
Evidence Code. For instance, the evidence would be
admissible in either a criminal or civil proceeding if the
statements have probative value that is not substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Yousef at 140–141. The
court would have discretion to admit the statements if it
was convinced that the prejudicial effect of admitting such
statements did not substantially outweigh its probative
value. The admission of statements obtained from official
torture in a foreign country would be decided based on the
court’s determination of its probative value weighed
against its prejudicial effect. This is in stark contrast to the
position under UK law, the European Convention on
Human Rights, and Article 15 of the Torture Convention
that requires such evidence to be inadmissible in a court of
law. The US could be in potential breach of its obligations
under the Torture Convention.
The House of Lords decision in A and others will have
important implications for how the war on terrorism will
be fought in domestic courts and administrative tribunals.
For instance, what type of evidential standard should a
country adopt for its tribunal to apply when weighing the
likelihood that statements offered against a suspected
terrorist have been obtained by official torture? In his
statement, Lord Bingham suggested that administrative
tribunals should determine as a preliminary matter
whether the statement was obtained from a country known
or widely suspected of practising torture. If so, then the
tribunal should not admit the statement unless the tribunal
could be satisfied that there was no “real risk” that the
statement was obtained by torture. This apparently would
require the Home Secretary to prove to the tribunal on the
balance of probabilities that the statement was not
procured by official torture.
Lord Hope, in a concurring opinion, recognised that “a
conventional approach to the burden of proof was
inappropriate”, and it would be unfair to expect the
detainee to prove anything because he would not have
access to sufficient information. However, he disagreed
with Lord Bingham’s “real risk” test by observing that
Article 15’s exclusionary rule only applied to a “statement
that was established to have been made under torture.” As
an alternative, Lord Hope suggested that the test laid down
by article 15 should require the tribunal to make “diligent
inquiries into the sources that it was practicable to carry
out” and on the balance of probabilities determine
whether ‘the information relied on by the Home Secretary
was obtained under torture’. Rather than requiring the
Home Secretary to prove that there was no “real risk”,
Lord Hope’s approach would require the terrorist suspect
to identify practicable sources of information to show that
it was more likely than not that the Home Secretary had
relied on information obtained by official torture.
Both of these approaches raise a number of concerns
regarding practicality of identifying sources of torture and
fairness to the terrorist suspect of proving the likelihood of
official torture in a foreign country. Until these concerns
are resolved, there will be continuing concern about the
efficacy of the human rights protections for detainees and
terrorist suspects and there will be uncertainty regarding
the appropriate approach for law enforcement to follow in
protecting society from the real risk of terrorism.
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